TPM is not secure enough without PIN or additional authentication mechanisms
Recently, I was involved in security testing of the device where TPM was used to store hard drive encryption key and authorize the platform before the key is unsealed from TPM to allow the OS loader or OS itself to decrypt hard drives. As the device was a stand alone device without possibility of using of another authorization methods (such as PIN, password or another key stored i.e. on USB key or a smart card) I have identified a possible attack vector how to disclose the encryption key and decrypt the data stored on the protected partitions of the hard drive. The idea was based on the fact the he TPM chip is usually connected to standardized and well documented LPC bus on the motherboard. On this bus the communication is not encrypted so it is possible to capture the traffic using a low-cost digital analyzer device and decode the LPC / TPM ACPI protocols later using the simple Java program. It took about two days (including preparations and simple LPC/TPM ACPI decoder ...